Will Reza Pahlavi lead Iran in 2026?
As of November 11, 2026, Polymarket traders put the chance of "Will Reza Pahlavi lead Iran in 2026?" at 1%, down 1 points over the past week. $11.9M has traded on this market.
Three months of it
Show the numbers
| Date | Yes |
|---|---|
| August 13, 2026 | 3.3% |
| August 20, 2026 | 3.0% |
| August 27, 2026 | 3.0% |
| September 3, 2026 | 4.3% |
| September 10, 2026 | 3.0% |
| September 17, 2026 | 2.6% |
| September 24, 2026 | 3.3% |
| October 1, 2026 | 3.4% |
| October 8, 2026 | 3.1% |
| October 17, 2026 | 2.7% |
| October 26, 2026 | 2.3% |
| November 5, 2026 | 1.5% |
| November 11, 2026 | 1.1% |
Quick answers
- What are the odds: Will Reza Pahlavi lead Iran in 2026?
- Polymarket traders priced it at 1% as of November 11, 2026, down 1 points from a week earlier. A 1 cent YES contract pays $1 if it happens.
- How are these odds calculated?
- They are the YES price of each contract on Polymarket: the midpoint of the best bid and ask when the spread is 10 cents or less, otherwise the last trade. Prices are fetched from Polymarket's public data and this page shows when.
How this one gets decided
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Reza Pahlavi de facto holds and exercises the powers of the head of state of Iran by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” Reza Pahlavi will be considered to hold power if he exercises primary governing authority over the Iranian state during the specified timeframe, including effective control over the armed forces, national institutions, and core executive decision-making, regardless of formal title, constitutional designation, or international recognition. Formal appointment, recognition by the United Nations, or recognition by foreign governments is not required. Indicators of de facto authority may include control over the armed forces and security services; control over executive ministries and state administrative institutions; enforcement of national laws; issuance of binding national directives; and effective control over the capital and core state infrastructure. Symbolic status, foreign recognition without domestic control, exile leadership without effective authority inside Iran, nomination without effective authority, or ceremonial or transitional status without governing control will not q